• Reference
    X550/8/1/1708
  • Title
    1-8-17 The Battalion in accordance with Brigade Orders moved to Chateau Segard Area No.4. CHATEAU SEGARD 2-8-17 Spent at Chateau Segard. The men were rested as much as possible and only scouts and runners were sent forward to reconnoitre the route up for pending operations. 3-8-17 A general inspection of kit took place in the morning. In the evening at 7 PM the Battalion moved up by companies to "Railway dugouts" at Shrapnel Corner arriving about 9 PM. RAILWAY DUGOUTS 4-8-17 Each company spent the day in cleaning out their dugouts and improving the path at the foot of the embankment. the battalion was in support during its occupation of these dug outs. 5-8-17 The companies continued to improve the path at the foot of the embankment and built an esplanade along the triangle pond. Eight scouts and two runners per company and Headquarters reconnoitred the route up to the HOOGE TUNNEL dug outs at the elbow in the HOOGE MENIN Road where our Headquarters were to be for the pending operations. MAJOR BRIDCUTT DSO and the Adjutant attended a conference at Brigade H.Q. at DORMY HOUSE end of RITZ trenches at 6 PM to discuss the general principles of the intended attack. 6-8-17 Scouts again reconnoitred the route up to the wire. Officers also went up to insure that no mistake should take place when the battalion moved up to the line either to counter attack or relieve the garrison. A practice standing to was ordered at 5.30 PM. B Company reported ready to move off at 5.40 PM and was duly congratulated upon this fine performance. 7-8-17 Warning orders having been received the Battalion prepared for a move up to the line during the day. Orders were received in the afternoon to relieve the 12 MIDDLESEX in the line in the evening and to carry out the intended attack during the ensuing forty eight hours. All companies had dumped their packs issued their iron rations and water by 6.30 PM. D Company moved off at 7 PM followed by A Company at 7.30 PM, B and C Company moved at 8 PM and 8.30 PM. D Company relieved two platoons of the 12th Middlesex Regiment in the front line from SURBITON VILLAS to the road in J7D (app 1) A company relieved a company of the same regiment in the HOOGE TUNNEL at the elbow in the HOOGE MENIN Roadmarked with a corss in App I. This company was detailed as counter attack company. B and C companies were situated in the RITZ trenches as Brigade reserve. Battalion headquarters relieved the 12th MIDDLESEX H.Q. in the HOOGE TUNNEL at the elbow in the MENIN road. The relief was completed by about midnight. The night was fairly active, A and D companies encountered considerable hostile shell fire in moving up through SANCTUARY WOOD. cap H.DRIVER DSO and Cap O.KINGDON put out wire forming up lines about 100 yards in advance of our trenches during the night to facilitate the laying of the forming up tape for pending operations. Lt.STEWART also put down a white tape to make a convenient route from Bn HQ to the firing line in SURBITON VILLAS. 7th (S) Bn Bedfordshire Regt. 7-8-17 Information 1. The II Corps will capture and hold at an early date INVERNESS COPSE, GLENCORSE WOOD and the Southern end of WESTHOEK RIDGE. 2. "Z" day and "Zero" hour will be notified later. 3. The attack will be carried out by the 18th Division on the right, 25th Division on the left, 7th Brigade will attack on our left. 4. The 54th Brigade will attack on a two Battalion and the 55th Brigade on a one Battalion frontage. 5. The 11th Royal Fusiliers will form the right assaulting Battalion and will form up on a general line J14.c.1.5.55 - J14.a.0.0. - J13.b.9.3. They will fight their way through to the final objective, consolidate and hold it. Instructions 6. The Battalion (7th Bedfords) will form up along a line J.13.b.9.3. J.7.d.95.15. road exclusive and fight their way to final objective, consolidate and hold it. 7. Disposition of Companies "C" Coy. will be the right assaulting Company. "B" Coy. will be the left assaulting Company. "A" Coy. will be in Support. "D" Coy Reserve Company. 8. Dividing Line The approximate dividing line between Fusiliers and Bedfords is J.13.b.9.3 - J.14.a.90.55 - J.14.b.65.65. 9. Mopping Up One Company Northants will be attached to the Battalion for Mopping Up, this Company will not proceed beyond the road running from J.9.c.6.2 through J.8.c.7.1 Companies Wilden ldo their own mopping up after crossing this road Task of Assaulting Coys The two assaulting Coys ("C" & "B") will fight their way through to the final objective (YELLOW LINE) consolidate and hold it. "A" COMPANY will follow in close support to the assaulting Companies ready to give them any assistance to gain their final objective. This Company must lose no opportunity to push the assault forward until the final objective (YELLOW LINE) is reached. If the assaulting Companies are not held up or checked, the Company will follow them, fighting in close support and be ready to render them any assistance on the YELLOW LINE, they may require - they will also act as counter-attack Company should the necessity arise. After the YELLOW LINE has been gained and all is quiet, this Company should be tucked away in close support to the front line. "D" COMPANY will be in Reserve and will move up as the attack goes forward to a position in JARGON TRENCH, ready to render any assistance that may be required, should the situation become critical they will support the front line Companies in such a manner that no ground that has been once gained is lost. If the attack is successful orders will be sent to this Company from the Battalion Commander, but this does not prevent the Company Commander from issuing his own instructions to prevent any ground being given up after once it has been gained. MACHINE GUNS Two Mahine Guns will be attached to the Battalion, these Guns will move forward with the Reserve Coy ("D" Coy) until the objective is gained, they will then be placed in position in Strong Points 4 and 5. FORMING UP The lines for forming up will be marked out by Y-Z night with telephone wire and tape in accordance with verbal instructions given to all concerned. THE ADVANCE The signal for the advance will be the opening of the Shrapnel Barrage when Bayonets will be fixed and the attack carried out. DRESS Fighting Order plus one day's rations including the Iron Rations). RIFLEMEN: 170 rds S.A.A. BOMBERS: 5 No.5's, 120 rds S.A.A. RIFLE BOMBERS: 5 No.23, 120 rds S.A.A. MOPPERS UP: 5 No.23's or 5 No.5's, 120 rds S.A.A. All Other ranks will carry their usual complement. EXPLOITING SUCCESS After reaching the objectives on the YELLOW LINE patrols will be pushed out to reconnoitre the S.W. portion of NONNE-BOSSCHEN from about the Western end of the Track running through the SCH in BOSSCHEN to the track running along the southern border of the wood NONNE-BOSSCHEN - this will be carried out in conjunction with similar patrols of the 11th Royal Fusiliers. WATER All Water Bottles must as far as possible be kept filled. PRISONERS Brigade collecting points at J.13.a.9.13 LIASON Lt.H.B.Stewart will act as Liason Officer between Bn. Headquarters and the 8th Loyal North Lancs on our left. (SGD) J.H.BRIDCUTT MAJOR COMDG. 7TH BN. BEDFORD REGT. HOOGE TUNNEL 8-8-17 The battalion held the line. Officers and NCOs were carefully instructed in the ground to be attacked and peculiar features and land marks were pointed out to them, they were subsequently examined to ascertain whether they had thoroughly grasped the situation. Enemy strong points and wired areas were pointed out and noted. About 7 PM a heavy storm blew up and intense rain fell, the ground became exceedingly heavy and very muddy. the attack arranged for the 9th was postponed 24 hours. 9-8-17 The day proved fine with a good breeze blowing which helped to dry the ground. Officers and NCOs continued to examine the features of the landscape to be attacked over on the following day. In the evening the weather again appeared threatening but blew up fine during the night. Cap H.DRIVER and Cap O.KINGDON put out the forming up tapes about 10 PM. At 11 PM the leading platoons of B and C companies began to arrive as described in App II. After receiving tea and rum the platoons were passed forward with guides to their forming up positions. 7th (S) Bn.Bedfordshire Regt. Officers to go into Action Headquarters Major J.H.Bridcutt D.S.O. Comdg. Officer. Capt.W.J.W.Colley M.C. Adjutant. Lieut.H.B.Stewart Lewis Gun Officer. Lieut.S.R.Chapman Signal Officer. Capt.J.A.Vlasto (R.A.M.C.) Medical Officer "A" Company Capt.R.O.Clark O.C.Coy. 2/Lieut.F.Halsey 2/Lieut.K.H.Bishop. "B" Company Capt.H.Driver D.S.O. O.C.Coy. 2/Lieut.G.R.Craig. "C" Company Capt.O.Kingdon O.C.Coy. 2/Lt.C.A.Lawrence. 2/Lt.N.C.E.Cockburn. 2/Lt.S.M.Connor. "D" Company Capt.J.C.M.Ferguson O.C.Coy. 2/Lt.G.S.Richards 2/Lt.E.C.H.Conyers. GLENCORSE WOOD 10-8-17 At 3.30 AM all companies were formed up for the attack timed for 4.35 AM. C company on the right B Company on the left A Company in close support and D Company in reserve under Caps O.KINGDON, H.DRIVER DSO, R.O.CLARK, J.C.M.FERGUSON. The forming up was carried out in an exceedingly steady manner under considerable enemy artillery and M/G fire and great credit is due to the company commanders for the cool and deliberate manner in which they handled their companies. At zero hour 4.35 an intense British barrage opened and the battalion moved forward close under its protection. A full account of the glorious manner in which all ranks carried out their duties appears in APP.II The battalion famous for its fighting spirit in the past eclipsed all former deeds of gallantry, when heavy wire held up the foremost men, those behind stood on lumps of earth and rubbish and fired over the heads of those cutting the wire, sledom have any troops shown such brilliant dash and utter contempt for the Bosch. By 5.13 AM NONNE BOSSCHEN Wood was reached and at the same time all other objectives occupied. Within an hour SAA Lewis gun drums etc had been dispatched to the advanced positions and much consolidation had been cerried out. Very early in the operations the 11th Royal Fusiliers operating on our right and the Queens operating on their right became adversely involved with a Bosch strong point at the N.W. Corner of INVERNESS COPSE and the whole attack on our right became confused and fell back. The Fusiliers fell back from their advanced posts on to a line running along the ridge from the SW Corner of GLENCOURSE WOOD to CLAPHAM JUNCTION. This change in the situation exposed our right flank and necessitated the partial expenditure of D Company to make a defensive flank which was carried out by cap Ferguson in a quick and clever manner. Very severe fighting resulted later in the day through the unsatisfactory position in which our troops were placed. About 5.30 PM the Bosch showed considerable movement and it became evident that a heavy counter attack was imminent: by 6 PM the attack developed and by 7 PM the situation was severe, the Bosch attacking in mass and our own guns shooting desperately short. This condition lasted till 9 PM by which time although we had lost connection with our advanced posts the main position was still firmly in our hands and the enemy casualties were extremely heavy. About 8.30 PM the 6th Royal Berks were sent up to relieve our companies and one company of Norfolks took over the strong point at the SW Corner of GLENCOURSE WOOD from which the Fusiliers had previously been relieved by us. By 2 AM the Regiment had been completely relieved by the Royal Berks and moved back to CHATEAU SEGARD Area No.4. Roll of officers in action APP III Casualties APP IV Operation Orders APP V Aeroplane Photo APP VI CHATEAU SEGARD 11-8-17 The morning was spent in rest. 2 PM The Battalion moved to DICKEBUSH NEW CAMP The afternoon was spent in clothing and fitting. 12-8-17 4 AM The Battalion received orers that the 54 Brigade less 7th Bedfordshire Regt would move back to rest billets. the 7th Bedfordshire Regt would be attached to the 53 Brigade. the Battalion was reorgainsed into four companies of two platoons each, each platoon had one rifle section one rifle grenadier section one bombing section one L/Gsection. Total Battalion strength about 300. 11 AM Orders were received from Division to move into a field close to Div.H.Q. and rest there until the evening. 2 PM After dinners the Battalion moved to the field mentioned where the Div.General (General Lee) address [sic] a few words to the men and thanked them for their gallant behaviour in the action of August 10th. He also said that he had given instructions to [sic] we were not to be used unless absolutely necessary. 18 DIV H.Q. 6.30 PM The afternoon having been spent in receiving SAA rations etc the companies moved off at 6.30 PM A and D companies to CRAB CRAWL C and B and HQ to RAILWAY DUGOUTS. 11 PM The Battalion was in support to 53 Brigade. 13-8-17 The companies prpared for action if necessary, guides etc reconnoitred the routes. During the night HQ and B & C Companies were heavily shelled with gas shells. From: Officer Commanding 7th (S) Battalion Bedfordshire Regt. [Appendix III] To: Headquarters 54th Infantry Brigade. In accordance with B.M.465 I have the honour to forward herewith a brief account of the operations undertaken by the 7th (S) Bn.Bedfordshire Regiment on the 10th August 1917 13/8/17 J.H.Bridcutt, Major Comdg 7th (S) Bn.Bedfordshire Regt. On Y/Z night the Battalion was distributed as follows: one Company ("D" Coy Company Commander Capt.J.C.M.Ferguson) was holding the battle front, one Company ("A" Coy Company Commander Capt.R.O.Clark) was in close support sheltered in tunnel on MENIN road (about J.13.a.9.3) two Coys ("B" & "C" Companies Commanders Capt.H.Driver & Capt.O.Kingdon respectively) were quartered in the RITZ area (RITZ trenches). Zero was fixed for 4.35 a.m. and all troops were to be in their jumping off position by 3.30 a.m. At about 11.50 p.m. the first platoon of "B" Coy (left assaulting Coy) arrived at a point on the MENIN Road about J13.a.9.3. here they were checked by two Officers (Capt.W.J.W.Colley, Lieut.H.B.Stewart & the Regtl.Sergt.Major). Each platoon was counted by one Officer. Each man was given a cup of hot tea & Rum as he passed. Each platoon Commander & Sergt. was handed copy of situation map. Each platoon Commander given his guide to conduct him to SURBITON VILLAS. The remaining platoons of the assaulting Companies "B" & "C" arrived at this point at about one or two minutes interval and were checked and passed as already described. A Tape was laid previously frm this point to SURBITON VILLAS (this tape was independent of the forming up tapes) along which each platoon moved and could not possibly miss their way. As each platoon arrived at a spot near SURBITON VILLAS they were met by a platoon guide and the Company Commanders and were conducted to their battle formation - here they laid down in perfect quietness until the first note of the guns sang out. "A" Company (the Company in immediate support) moved from their cover in the MENIN road tunnel by platoons to their place in battle formation, under the same arrangements as the assaulting Companies. "D" Company (already in and holding the line) furnished a covering party (one platoon) who were posted about 150 yards in front of the forming up tapes, pieces of trench which were almost identical to their forming up position afforded this Company protection in case of Bosche barrage being turned on; this they occupied, moving forwards to JARGON trench as previously ordered as the attack went forward. THE BATTLE The arrangements for forming up went without a hitch and at the appointed time (4.35 a.m.) the guns opened and the attack went forward in a most determined manner to the final objective which was reached at 5.13 a.m. Some 100-150 Bosches were in GLENCOURSE WOOD on the Battalion front and two machine guns, these were knocked out & the teams destroyed in such a rapid manner that any organised resistance by the Bosch was at once overcome and most of the Bosch that had not been killed at once cried "KAMERAD" and ran forward into our lines most of them wounded & fearfully frightened. After the objective had been reached battle patrols were sent out & posts established in usual way, along the South Western end of NONNE-BOSSCHEN WOOD as near to the protective barrage as it was safe to get. (i.e. about 200 yards). The Battalion then commenced to consolidate. "A"-"B" + "C" Coys = front line "D" Coy - Reserve Coy = JARGON TRENCH and a Battalion carrying party was sent forward with S.A.A. and Lewis Gun drums etc. During the day the Bosch made repeated attempts to from up & deliver what appeared to be a counter-attack of some strength, he was prevented time after time from doing sp by rifle and machine gun fire, but owing to the expenditure of S.A.A. and the difficulty of replenishing same, care rose to anxiety and probability of our foremost line & right flank being overcome. At this stage of the operation I considered it advisable if the position was to be held with any degree of certainty it required artillery support in the form of a few shots every few minutes on the only places the Bosch could use to form up under cover from view i.e. NONNE BOSSCHEN, INVERNESS & SOUTH WESTERN portion of POLYGON WOOD. This was suggested over the telephone but so far as could be understood it could not be arranged, consequently it appeared to me & others at the front that it was a question of S.O.S. for Artillery or nothing at all. And this signal was repeatedly seen in the air at various points along the line but no S.O.S. was asked for by the 7th Bedfords until towards the evening when it was too obvious that the Bosch intended to have a final struggle to get back the ground we held, as troops were seen emerging from each of the three woods above mentioned, and a dense cloud of smoke & gas was being sent over which obscured everything from view. At this time I cannot state the exact clock hour the artillery opened and with terrible execution, but the Bosch line came on delivering their attack on the right flank of the Battalion. The advanced posts were either killed or captured, it is impossible to say which, but judging from the very intense barrage which the Bosch rolled over GLENCORSE WOOD they were undoubtedly killed, a certain amount of confusion set in on our right and it was only by firm determination that the strong point at J.14.a.4.2. which I had taken over from the right Battalion (11th Royal Fusiliers) and JARGON TRENCH was held. When the attack was fully developing re-inforcements (two Coys) of the Royal Berkshire Regt arrived and were sent forward to hold our original front line in case the Bosch succeeded in his object to gain the strong point and high ridge STIRLING CASTLE - STRONG POINT J 14.a.4.2. - JARGON TRENCH. The attack however did not materialise and only his advanced line got near the position. The situation quietened down and the relief of the Battalion by the Royal Berkshire Regt was carried out by 2 A.M. and the Battalion withdrew to CHATEAU SEGARD. Established line handed over was JARGON TRENCH - LADY'S LEG - STRONG POINT J14.a.4.2. Situation of forward posts was somewhat obscure. It us worthy of record the splendid manner in which the two Coys of the Royal Berkshire Regt came up to re-inforce. The Bosch had a terrific barrage on the support line through which they travelled without a waver, shells falling into and all round each platoon. Major Longhurst of this Regt. arrived in advance of these two Coys and rendered most valuable assistance in establishing a second line of defence in case of necessity. Lessons 1. I venture to think had a fresh Battalion been close at hand when the situation on the right became obscure and pushed in, in attack formation a good deal more ground would have been taken and the Boche routed from his position. 2. Artillery should not cease firing on protected lines until Battalion Commander is satisfied all is well. Artillery ceased on the 10th without any reference to Battalions (at least not to 7th Bedfords). I consider it of great importance that Battalion Commanders should be able to convey to Artillery which fire other than S.O.S. is required. 3. No telephone wire to be laid beyond Brigade HQ as it is used for all kinds of things that hopelessly give away arrangements, and too many other ranks have access to it and the Commanders of the sector having no knowledge of many things happening on the wire unless he or his Adjutant sits by it. The telephone was a nuisance and not the least assistance to the Battalion on the 10th inst. 4. It took from 5 to 6 minutes before the Hun Barrage got really going on our lines, it was severe when it did do so. 5. The 54th Brigade arrangements for ordering up the reserve Coys from RITZ area and the Coys for mopping up was excellent, timing was also extremely good. 6. To avoid any Platoon going astray I placed Battalion Police posts 100-200 yds apart along the ATN track from RITZ area to MENIN road passing point. 7. Our own Artillery inflicted many casualties on our troops by firing very short what appeared to be one 8" gun in particular. 8. The Boche attack was guided by a line of his men at a few paces apart firing very lights, during the advance these were with the first wave. 14-8-17 Early in the morning we received orders to relieve the 10th Essex Regiment at STIRLING CASTLE. Guides were at once sent up to arrange the relief. Orders were received for us to make an attack on INVERNESS COPSE on the 16th inst. we were surprised after what the general had said only two days before, but all were cheery and ready to do all they could. major Bridcutt and the Adjutant went up to STIRLING CASTLE to arrange the relief of the 10th ESSEX. MAJOR BRIDCUTT remained up and the Adjutant returned to RAILWAY DUGOUTS to see the companies off. 7.30 PM The companies set out for the relief. 12 MIDNIGHT Relief complete. Battle Order A and D companies in front line with one platoon C Company attached to each. B Company in reserve. STIRLING CASTLE 15-817 The night having passed off quietly with only the usual amount of shelling the Battalion continued to hold the line. the 6th Royal Berks were on our left and a Battalion of North Staffs on our right. Heavy shelling of our positions took place during the day. B Company was detailed to carry out the attack on the Bosch strong point at J14 c 4.4 NW Corner of INVERNESS COPSE.,see APP I on the 16th inst. 2Lt.CRAIG being in command examined the ground and explained the situation to his company. 16-8-17 B Company having formed up on the tapes put out by 2nd Lt.CRAIG during the night attacked the enemy strong point at J14 c.4.4. (APP I) This attack was carried out in conjunction with a large offensive by the Division on our left; a heavy shrapnel barrage opened at ZERO hour (4.45 AM) and 4.5 howitzers shot on strong points. Owing to some mistake a battery of 4.5 howitzers detailed to shoot on the enemy's strong point at J 14 c.4.4 fired short and on to our B Company about to move forward to the attack, knocking 50% of their effectives out. Cap Ferguson at once supported with a platoon of D Company but owing to the heavy enemy M/G fire little could be done and the attempt to capture the strong point was abandoned. 7 AM The day was chiefly spent inartillery duals no further infantry activity taking place on our sector. 17-8-17 The Battalion continued to hold the line, the 6th Royal Berkshire were relieved by the 12 MIDDLESEX also lent to 53 Brigade by 54 Brigade. This relief took place during night of 16/17. During the night 17/18th the Battalion was relieved by the Rifle Brigade and moved back to DICKEBUSH RAILHEAD. 7th (S) Bn. Bedfordshire Regt. Casualties 2/Lt.S.M.Connor. Killed in Action 10.8.17 2/Lt.F.Halsey Missing 10/8/17 Capt.H.Driver D.S.O. Wounded 10.8.17 2/Lt.E.C.H.Conyers Wounded 10.8.17 Capt.J.C.M.Ferguson Wounded still at duty 10.8.17 Lieut.H.F.Trewman Wounded still at duty 7.8.17 2/Lt.G.R.Craig Wounded still at duty 8.8.17 Summary of Casualties O.R.s Killed 35 Wounded 163 Died of Wounds 5 Missing 47 Missing Believed Killed 6 Missing Believed Wounded 3 259 Incurred from 10/8/17 to 17/8/17 inclusive DICKEBUSH RAILHEAD 18-8-17 11.30AM The Battalion entrained from DICKEBUSH RAILHEAD and moved to ARNEKE arriving at 4 PM and marching to billets at BUYSSCHEURE arriving at 8 PM. BUSSES were supplied for kits and men who could not march. BUYSSCHEURE 19-8-17 The Battalion rested. 20-8-17 The Battalion refitted and Bathed. 21-8-17 A draft of 70 having arrived companies commenced reorganising into four platoons. 22-8-17 Training Platoon and Company Drill. 23-8-17 6.30 AM The Battalion went to the sea side by bus for a holiday, 7.30 PM the scene of these festivities was near DUNKIRK. 24-8-17 The V Army musketry range was allotted to the Battalion. The men were taken there by lorries starting at 9 AM. the rifle shooting of the men was good each man fired 15 rounds at a figure target, and L/Gs had plate firing. 25-8-17 Platoon training. 26-8-17 11 AM Church parade. 27-8-17 Company training. 28-8-17 Brigade rifle range was allotted to us but owing wet weather we could not use it. A Route March took place. 29-8-17 Companies had a [sic] advantage of training under a special Bayonet fighting instruction. 30-8-17 Company training and specialists training. 31-8-17 Company training.
  • Date free text
    Aug 1917
  • Production date
    From: 1917 To: 1917
  • Level of description
    item