Title
Carnoy Trenches
1-7-16
At about midnight on night of June 30th/July 1st 1916 the whole of the 54th I.Brigade was concentrated on its Battle Front ready for the assault on morning of 1st July. Assaulting Battalions were 7th Bedfords & 11th R.Fusiliers, in support: 6th Northants and in reserve 12th Middlesex. An artillery bombardment waged heavily all night and increased in intensity up till 7.30 am, Zero Hour, when the assaulting Battalions stormed the German first line trenches. Operation Orders appended. A special account of the events is being compiled by the Commanding Officer and will be appended hereto also
Pommiers Redoubt
2-7-16
At about 2 am, after consolidating as much of Pommiers Redoubt & Beetle Alley & New Trench as was possible in the time, the Battalion returned to Carnoy from the enemy's captured trenches & rested. At about 7 pm. the Battn. moved forward again as a reserve Battn to Emden & Austrian Trenches (German). Battn.Hd.Qrs. at Piccadilly.
Brigade Report
54th Brigade
Enclosed herewith report on operations 1/2 July for information of G.O.C. 54th Brigade
Sir. I beg to forward herewith report on the operations carried out by the Battn under my Command on 1/2 July 1916.
In a report of this nature, in order to arrive at a clear understanding of the various incidents that took place, where the advance was held up, and where it proceeded, it appears advisable to divide the front allotted to the Battn into right and left attack. The dividing line between the assaulting Coys ran roughly through the triangle and left of Pommiers Redoubt. The right started on Bay Point then swung half right on to Poppof Lane keeping in touch with 53rd Brigade. The left was directed on Austrian Junction to a point about 80 yds west of Pommiers Redoubt.
Assaulting Coys.
Right attack - B Company - under Capt Bull
Left attack - C Company under Capt Clegg
Supporting Company
D Company under Capt Lloyd supported the attack of the two assaulting Companys [sic]
Reserve Formations
A Company under Captain Percival was held in Battalion Reserve
The Battn was formed up in four forming up trenches each coy of the assaulting Coys on a two platoon frontage of 175 yds each, with one platoon in support and one in Company Reserve. No.3 Company acted as support to the two leading Coys No.4 Company in Battn Reserve.
The first three waves of each Coy moved in extended order. The 4th way [sic. wave] in sections.
No.3 Coy moved in Sections in Artillery Formation.
No.4 Coy moved in Platoons in Artillery Formation.
I would here call attention to the fact that although Nos. 3 & 4 Coys moved in what would appear to be close formations yet their losses while remaining in their formations was extremely small. Their losses really began when called into the final stages of the attack.
As this formation is more mobile and infinitely more under the control of their leaders it is one that might be adhered to on future occasions and the fact that they are not so vulnerable as would appear at first sight might with advantage be made more widely known.
Touch was maintained from rear to front. The result was good especially as regards the 3rd & 4th Companies and permitted the leaders of the assaulting coys to devote all their attention to the forcing of the enemy's position, in addition to keeping the largest number of rifles in the front waves.
The vital responsibility of keeping touch with units on right and left remained with the leaders of the assaulting coys.
Right Attack
At 7.28 the Right Attack started to move out, Zero being 7.30. I considered this most necessary, as it had some distance to traverse before reaching the 1st Line German trenches. 2ndly in order to get straight on its first line of advance, it had to move half left before the right of the Company could rest on Bay Point. 3rdly Previous to the intense bombardment enemy machine guns had been particularly active and I wished to get the men through our wire whilst this bombardment continued. 4thly It seemed of vital necessity not to run any risks in being late for the prearranged barrage up to the Pommiers Redoubt.
As the machine gun fire even on cessation of intense bombardment was still very galling. The waves hurried through the gaps in the wire and doubled down the slope. It was on the gaps and the top of the slope that the machine gun fire was principally directed. There was practically none at the foot of the slope. Here the Right attack formed up in deliberate formation, making absolutely certain of its true line of advance. It then advanced as if on parade. The waves were perfectly dressed, intervals and distances as it seemed to me from our trenches, kept extraordinarily well.
The machine gun fire still continued very active and casualties were seen to occur before Austrian Trench was reached, but the waves still continued on their way, seemingly without a check.
Between the Austrian Trench & Emden Trench the Company was practically leaderless as regards officers, all having been either killed or wounded. There was practically no opposition except from machine gun fire. This principally came well away from our right flank which from the early commencement of the fight was most exposed owing to the Battn of the 53rd Brigade on our right being unable to advance at the same rapid rate as our right attack. Severe machine gun fire seemed to come from Poppof Lane, which did considerable execution. It was not until reaching the ground between Bund & Pommiers Trench that a real check occurred. Here the wire in front of Pommiers was not cut and a mixed party of the right attack with men of the Berkshire Regt proceeded to cut the wire in a most methodical way. In the words of Capt Bull in a letter to me. "The hour outside that trench will be a nightmare for years to come and this was our expensive time. There were about 20 Berkshires & about the same numbers of my lot. [blank] were splendid, the way they cut the wire just as if there was nothing doing["].
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1. The Comp. Sergt. Major of the right attack states that the German front line when he crossed it was filled with barbed wire around spiked stakes. From previous reports, which this statement confirms, it would appear as if the Germans hold only parts of the front line, and those parts are defended with machine guns only. As their second line was so close and contained deep dug outs this method appears to be quite possible and has its advantages in the event of a sudden raid. The C.S.M. further states that the wiring and spikes seemed to have been recently put in. This may have been the case as a guard against our continual raids during the preliminary bombardment. The left of the right attack was held up by a machine gun in the right corner triangle, firing across front of right attack but this and was put out of action by the bombers of the left attack and by men of the right attack crawling up the right side of the triangle.
I would here call attention to the close co-operation of the assaulting companies, from the triangle to the redoubt this was from all accounts most marked, which enabled all engaged to keep to the timetable laid down. The right attack or in all events large portions of it arrived at Pommiers Redoubt roughly at 8.30 am.
As regards the actual storming of the Redoubt, this was carried out piecemeal, elements of B, C & D companies the latter having pushed in sections here and there, all taking part. It is quite clear that the front face was forced by parties swinging round to the flanks. Here many individual acts of great gallantry & devotion to duty were performed, as the German front trench which was held very tenaciously by the enemy was filled with their dead. Here too our losses were heavy, many of the dead lay round the front and flank of the redoubt. It is unquestionable that the Germans who remained in the Redoubt were either ordered or fully prepared to defend this last vital point in their line of defences to the last.The fight at this point was therefore extremely obstinate and costly to both sides , for the redoubt was not in our hands entirely until roughly about 9.30 a.m. Our first elements having arrived at 8.30 a.m. which hour was the scheduled time. Before the Redoubt was taken men of all 3 coys had pushed on to the Maple Trench, which was subjected to a heavy shrapnel fire, and here it was that Captain Bull who had done splendid work , was wounded severely and had to retire.
Beetle Alley was next to be occupied, by that time, though platoons had been reorganized, and were under the control of very junior N.C.O.s the coys were still mixed. This applied especially to the right attack whose losses had been very heavy in the taking of part of Pommiers Trench & the Redoubt.
Those that were left were used in bombing attacks along the Montauban Alley & the eastern part of Beetle Alley, and during the latter part of the day, were among those who occupied White Trench until the relief of the Battn on the morning of July 2nd.
From all reports it would appear that the taking of the Redoubt was made by elements of all three companies and it is impossible to follow closely the operations of the right attack as such, from the time of their leaving the Pommiers Trench.
Left Attack
The left attack crossed our wire on the stroke of zero. It was straight opposite its line of advance and as regards direction had not the same difficulties to contend with as the right attack. It has been difficult to get exact details of what happened to the first two waves. From observation it appeared as if the lines of both assaulting companies were moving on at exact intervals. From a sergeant in the 4th wave who eventually took command of the Company it seemed to him that the 1st & 2nd wave became merged before reaching the Emden Trench. It is certain that the left attack passed quickly through our wire and doubled down the slope - reforming in the valley below. It is equally certain that their losses were heavier in the initial stages of the attack than the company on its right, for between Austrian & Emden a section of the company reserve had to be thrown in to make good a gap. Somewhere in the vicinity of Emden this part of the attack came under the German barrage but the men dashed through it suffering very few casualties, as they put it behind them. After Emden Trench the left attack was left without an officer. Between Bund & Pommiers the line became very ragged and there was some difficulty in keeping the formations as the fire was very heavy. The barrage on Pommiers Trench was so hot that the left attack pushed on and lay in the open beyond it and the Maple Trench.
Whilst waiting there this attack came under fire of machine guns & snipers. Men were laying in shell holes and any cover they could get, and there was again some considerable difficulty in reorganizing the line. Relief eventually came from the right which had got ahead of the left attack. For the latter were able to get at those who were holding up the left. As the Germans fell back the left attack followed closely on them, and some made their way into the Redoubt and some outside. The bulk of the left only remained about 20 minutes in the Redoubt and being scattered had once more to be reformed in the open and came under shell fire which was avoided by their pressing on, but unfortunately they ran into our own barrage which compelled them to fall back. Thus they waited and on the barrage lifting rushed forward & took Beetle Alley without opposition at the place they entered it. Patrols were then pushed forward and the work on consolidation proceeded with.
Those of the left attack who got into Beetle Trench apparently remained there, for from Emden Trench they were without officers, the company being under command of a sergeant.
It is to be regretted that no one either officer or N.C.O. who could be relied on was left with the first three waves, for further details explaining the reasons of their losses and cause of their being behind the right attack might would have been of very great value, and a more concise view of the situation from the beginning obtained.
Supporting Company
This went over 2 minutes after zero. Its losses in parts were nil, for there was no machine gun fire at the time it crossed our wire. Their losses commenced at German 2nd Line Trench from a machine gun in the Emden trench brought up after first waves had passed from a dug out. This gun was actually put out by the 3rd Company. An officer was with it, who shot Sergt. Newton [corrected in the margin to Laughton] and was in turn killed just a second too late by Sergt.Slough. between Emden & Bund Trench the right flank of the Fusiliers overlapped our left platoon. Before reaching Bund Trench all the officers of this Company were out of action. In the advance between Bund & Pommiers Trench, the Fusiliers eased off to their left leaving our front free, and here it was that a machine gun from left of Pommiers held up the whole attack . It was being used on the parapet & moved about. This gun must apparently have been taken on by the Fusiliers for it stopped firing for when the men rushed forward after being reinforced, they found heaps of ammunition but no gun. It was here that the elements of all three companies became mixed up, before taking the Redoubt and getting into Maple Trench. There is no doubt that the supporting company carried on those elements of B & C that had been severely handled. It is also quite certain that between the edge of Pommiers and Maple Trench certain parts of the line ran into our own artillery barrage and came under Heavy German barrage. Flares were lighted, which were acknowledged by an aeroplane and five minutes afterwards our fire ceased. Here as far as possible elements of the Coys were reorganized and Sergt.Slough took charge of the 3rd Company. On reaching Beetle Trench bombing parties were organized and they proceeded to clear the eastern edge of same, while others went on with work of consolidation. About 4 pm parties of Fusiliers & Bedfords occupied the White Trench, the latter remaining until recalled on the morning of July 2nd
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Reserve Company
Went through our wire at 7.40. This company came under quite a heavy barrage of shrapnel & machine gun fire. This latter seemed to come from direction of Black Alley. Half the losses of this company occurred while passing through the wire and two officers were put out of action before crossing our own fire trench. Times of reaching the German Trenches were as follows. Austrian Trench 7.50. Emden trench 7.55. Bund 8.20. Between Austrian Support & Emden a German barrage was encountered.
Company was reorganized in Bund Trench, leaving it at 9.15, and moved up towards Pommiers Trench. At 9.30 I gave orders while in the ? for the Reserve to push through and make for final objective as word was brought that the Redoubt was taken.
Before reaching the Redoubt this company went through a 3rd Barrage. The statement of Capt.Percival on his arrival at Redoubt is as follows.
"On arrival at Redoubt, a great state of confusion reigned. Men of four different Battalions (Bedfords, Fusiliers, Essex & Berkshires) no officers and no N.C.O.s. As the Fusiliers were making for the Beetle Trench I at once sent forward 3 platoons under Lt.Colley, with instructions not to go beyond it until arrival of 53rd Brigade on our right flank. I then set about the consolidation of Redoubt and told off men of the 53rd Brigade into bombing parties to clean up Montauban Alley. At 10.15 there were no signs of the main attack of the 53rd Brigade. A strong party of Germans were holding Montauban Alley at this time. The first attempt to clear it was not successful but a fresh party of men of the Essex Regt accomplished the clearing of it by 2.30 p.m. About 3.30 pm the same platoon of the Essex Regt. cleared Montauban Alley as far as Loop Trench. About 6 pm the Norfolk Regt. made good the remainder of Montauban Alley. Our machine guns assisted very materially during the whole time by flanking fire. At 6.15 pm New Trench was occupied by one platoon of Bedfords & 2 platoons Fusiliers. At 10 p.m. the construction of strong points S.W. of New Trench was commenced. At 10.30 covering party reported advance of Germans coming over ridge, these when fired on retired. The Coy was brought out of the line at 3.15 a.m.["]
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The above is a description of what happened as far as can be gathered from the most trustworthy sources now available. Had the losses in officers & senior N.C.O.s not been so heavy further details would have bee available.
On my arrival at the Redoubt the confusion mentioned by Capt.Percival was still very evident. My time of arrival was about 9.50.
Pommiers Lane was choked with men, principally 53rd Brigade, and I had considerable difficulty in thinning the men out as at any moment there was danger of heavy shell fire from the Germans.
The consolidation of our right flank especially was being rapidly put in hand, and was strongly held by Vickers & Lewis Machine Guns.
The situation at this time was critical. On the right the 53rd Brigade we seemed solidly held up with no signs of any advance of their main attack though considerable numbers of Essex & Berkshires had in some manner made their way into the Redoubt. Similarly on our left flank, the advance of the 91st Brigade had not made headway beyond Fritz Trench. The two assaulting Battns of the 54th Brigade had made good as far as Beetle Trench which was being consolidated. The Northampton Regt was close up in support. We were thus in a salient, on our right neither Montauban or Caterpillar Alleys were clear of Germans and there appeared to be heavy fighting in the direction of Montauban village. On our left Fritz Trench was held but to our left flank there was the wood of Mametz which might easily have harboured a large force for counter attack. Under the circumstances I deemed it more prudent to consolidate the positions already gained and to endeavour as far as possible to clear Montauban Alley in order to relieve the pressure on the 53rd Brigade.
The New Trench was therefore not truly occupied until our right flank had been made good, roughly about 6 pm though elements had reconnoitered it some time previously.
Strong points were at once put in hand at the places previously ordered.
The chief reasons of the success of the operations are in my opinion as follows.
1. The work of the artillery, with very few exceptions the wire was beautifully cut and the trenches filled up. The shooting was wonderfully accurate.
2. The training of the Battn at Picquigny. The time and attention to every detail that was carried out there was repaid a thousand fold. As an example I may quote that only three officers in the entire Battn got beyond Emden trench, most of the platoon and very many section leaders had gone, yet so thorough was the training beforehand that the men carried on entirely by themselves, knew where to go to and what to do when they got there.
3. The clear & concise orders that were received, nothing had been forgotten and provision made for all emergencies.
4. The good work done by the clearing up parties. The work done by the Northampton Regt was splendid and we had no shooting from behind. I would suggest that these parties, so absolutely necessary should be increased in strength.
5. The good work of the carrying up parties. In addition to those provided under Brigade arrangements, another party made up from odd men in the Battn about 30 in number, carried up with the 4th company a supply of SAA & bombs. This party then returned to the most advanced dump and continued during the whole day to maintain the supply. A large number of bombs were used in clearing Montauban Alley and without the supply furnished by this advanced party matters would have come to a standstill. They did most excellent work and never ceased carrying until a large stock of bombs & SAA had been accumulated.
I would suggest this advanced carrying party going with the 4th Company whenever possible.
6. The quickness with which the assaulting Battns left our Trenches. Where a prearranged timetable barrage is arranged, it seems imperative that the men should be quick off the mark. In the assault the two companies left our trenches before cessation of intense bombardment. They were thus able to take full advantage of the artillery barrage and consequently arrived at the Pommiers Redoubt at 8.30 a.m.
It would thus appear safer to risk a few casualties from our own guns than to miss the effect of the barrage and so come under the fire of enemy machine guns which are without doubt kept in dug outs until the barrage has stepped forward. This point has continually been insisted by all those who were in the first waves.
7. The close co-operation of all units in the assaulting waves. This was very marked, both between our two companies and the company of the Fusiliers on our left. With regard to the latter both at the Pommiers Trench and Redoubt they rendered most invaluable assistance at very critical times. Their help was very deeply appreciated and remarked on by the men of my Battn.
I would suggest also that in clearing Montauban Alley as far as the Loop Trench considerable assistance was given to the 53rd Brigade which enabled them to make good their final objective.
8. A sustained & continual advance.
This seems highly important and is exemplified in the taking of the Redoubt. Those immediately facing it were held up but elements which outflanked it pressed on, made use of their bombers & machine guns all then killing or forcing the defenders to fall back. Those held up immediately pressed forward and allowed the lines to maintain their formations. An advance of this nature has no doubt a big effect on the morale of the enemy.
Communications
Though minute and detailed arrangements were made for visual signalling and communication by runners, neither were very successful. Messages took a very long time in getting through, and the varying aspect of operations could not be brought quickly enough to the notice of higher authority.
Perhaps some form of small portable wireless telegraphy might be arranged for in future operations
Losses Killed Wounded Missing D of Wo.
Officers 2 13 = 15
O.R.s 79 212 6 9 = 306
In conclusion I would bring to your notice the wonderful steadiness and coolness of all ranks under heavy shell and machine gun fire. As before mentioned from Emden Trench to the taking of the Redoubt the men worked practically without officers and the majority of their senior platoon & section commanders. A truly wonderful performance when it is taken into consideration that their training had not reached its second year.
Both during the preliminary bombardment, when the weather was very bad, and the men were living in trenches filled with water day and night and during and after making good their final objective, the cheeriness and high morale of all ranks was remarkable.
I would bring to your notice for special recognition the following names -
Capt.Bull - who led the right attack with conspicuous gallantry, until severely wounded at the Maple Trench.
Capt.Lloyd - who was in charge of the 3rd Company until very severely wounded at the Emden Trench.
Capt. & Actg. Adjt.Bridcutt - This officer was my right hand man previous to and during the assault. He took five German prisoners single handed - organized and led two bombing parties agst Montauban Avenue. He was tireless in seeing to the organisation of the strong points and arranging for the comfort of the men.
Lt.Benson. This officer never ceased in his exertions to keep up communications. The difficulty of laying down wires was enormous, for the enemy shell fire was heavy and the wires were continually being cut. His system of runners was very good but unfortunately the casualties among them were very heavy. Six separate efforts were made by him personally to lay wires while exposed to this fire but without success, until it had to be abandoned.
Lt.Fleming Brown. This officer did remarkably good work as machine in charge of the machine guns. He personally superintended the placing of the machine guns in all strong points in the Redoubt, in Beetle Alley and in the New Trench. In addition he acted as orderly officer to me and rendered valuable assistance in letting me know the exact situation whenever it required clearing up.
The names of the officers, N.C.O.s & men were submitted for recognition in my.
I have the honour to be
Sir